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WI-FI LIABILITY: POTENTIAL LEGAL RISKS IN
ACCESSING AND OPERATING
WIRELESS INTERNET
Robert V. Hale II, Esq.t
I. BACKGROUND
Suppose you turn on your laptop while sitting at the kitchen table
at home and respond "OK" to a prompt about accessing a nearby
wireless Internet access point owned and operated by a neighbor.
What potential liability may ensue from accessing someone else's
wireless access point? How about intercepting wireless connection
signals? What about setting up an open or unsecured wireless access
point in your house or business? Attorneys can expect to grapple with
these issues and other related questions as the popularity of wireless
technology continues to increase.
Wireless local-area networks ("WLANs"), commonly known as
"Wi-Fi" ("wireless fidelity") networks, connect users to the Internet
through radio or infrared frequencies on the unlicensed 2.4 and 5 GHz
radio bands.' Under Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
("IEEE") standards, data transfer rates include 802.1 lb (11 Mbps),
802.1 la (54 Mbps), and 802.1 lg (125 Mbps). 2 Wi-Fi networks come
in several varieties, including WLANs deployed in private residences
and businesses, as well as WLANs in public areas (typically known as
"HotSpots"), such as airports, hotels and coffee shops. The rapid
growth and adoption of Wi-Fi technology includes both the
proliferation of wireless access availability, as well as the sale of Wi-
t C 2005 Robert V. Hale II. The author, an attorney in San Francisco, serves as an
advisor to the Cyberspace Committee of the California Bar and as Chair of the IP Section of the
San Francisco Bar Association Barristers Club. He has written articles and conducted
presentations on numerous Internet Law issues, including unsolicited e-mail, privacy and online
banking. He received his J.D. from the University of San Francisco School of Law and is an
active member of the California Bar.
1. See CNET News.com Staff, Wi-Fi: Unplugging Devices, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 13,
2003, at http://news.com.com/Wi-Fi:+Unplugging+devices/2100-7351_3-5072011 .html.
2. See IEEE, IEEE Wireless Standards Online, available at
http://standards.ieee.org/wireless/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
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Fi equipped devices.3 In addition to finding HotSpots in Starbucks,
hotels and airports, Wi-Fi users often discover multiple, open
WLANs in business districts and suburban neighborhoods. Most
recently, the City of Philadelphia announced plans to provide free
public Wi-Fi access.4  Numerous websites offer meticulously
documented maps of thousands of HotSpots in cities and localities
across the United States and abroad.5  Some Wi-Fi networking
equipment manufacturers now produce routers and access points that
support Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") capabilities,6 which
permit users with VoIP enabled devices to make telephone calls over
the Internet.
II. ACCESSING ANOTHER'S WIRELESS SIGNAL
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") makes
punishable whoever "intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access and thereby obtains - ...
information from any protected computer if the conduct involves
interstate or foreign communication. ', 7 Another section of the CFAA
makes punishable whoever "intentionally accesses a protected
computer without authorization, and, as a result of such conduct,
3.
The WLAN IC market is expected to grow strongly over the forecast period of
2004-2008 from approximately 47 min units shipped and $480 mln in revenue in
2003, to almost 390 min units shipped and $2.1 bin in revenue in 2008. In the
early years of the forecast, much of the shipment volume and revenue is
composed of WLAN ICs utilized in Wi-Fi aggregation equipment (e.g., access
points and wireless SOHO routers) and Wi-Fi clients (WLAN NICs used in
various types of PCs.).
WLANIC Market to Generate $2.1 Bin in 2008, ITFacts.biz, at
http://www.itfacts.biz/index.php?id=P 1826 (last visited Dec. 8, 2004).
4. Philly: Let Wi-Fi Ring, CBSNEWS.COM, Sept. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/0 l/tech/main639967.shtml.
5. See WiFinder, Inc., Find Public Access Wi-Fi Hotspots, available at
http://www.wifinder.con/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2004).
6. The FCC has described VoIP as follows:
VolP allows you to make telephone calls using a computer network, over a data
network like the Internet. VolP converts the voice signal from your telephone
into a digital signal that travels over the internet then converts it back at the other
end so you can speak to anyone with a regular phone number.
Federal Communications Comm'n Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Frequently
Asked Questions. What is VolP/Internet Voice?, at http://www.fcc.gov/voip/ (last visited Dec. 7,
2004).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2001).
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recklessly causes damage."8 The Act also provides for a private right
of action for individuals damaged by computer fraud.9 In each case,
the statute defines "protected computer" broadly to cover essentially
any computer connected to the Internet.' 0  To date, the Justice
Department has reported at least one CFAA prosecution involving
Wi-Fi. In United States v. Salcedo, the defendants hacked into the
computer system of a retail store through an unsecured Wi-Fi network
to steal credit card information while sitting in a car in the parking lot
of the store."
In the context of accessing a neighbor's WLAN, liability with
respect to both of the previously listed sections depends first on
establishing intentional access without authorization. "Access" refers
to the intent to access, not the intent to damage the protected
computer. 12 The user interface on Wi-Fi equipped devices typically
lists detectable access points automatically by a name the Wireless
Access Point ("WAP") owner designates. In a residential area, the
WAP name may refer to a neighbor's last name, such as in "Jones
Family Access Point." The act of choosing an access point in this
context could provide evidence of intentional access.
The CFAA does not define "without authorization" or what it
means to exceed authorization.' 3 Under CFAA case law, establishing
unauthorized access or lack of authorization has involved reference to
8. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii).
9. Id. § 1030(g).
10. Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B). The statute defines the term "protected computer" to mean a
computer "which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a
computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or
foreign commerce or communication of the United States."
11. See Bill of Indictment at 1-2, United States v. Salcedo, (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2003)
(No. 5.03cr53-MCK); Criminal Docket for Case #: 03-CR-53-ALL, available at
http://pacer.ncwd.uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-bin/pacer250.pl?puid=010945 2 85 5 7 (last visited Feb. 21,
2005); see also Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Western District of North Carolina,
Hacker Sentenced to Prison for Breaking into Lowe's Companies' Computers with Intent to
Steal Credit Card Information (Dec. 15, 2004), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/salcedoSent.htm.
Note that the defendants discovered the unsecured wireless network while driving around
charting wireless networks on their laptop (a geek sport known as "wardriving"). Salcedo and
others later returned to the network to perpetrate the crime. The federal court sentenced Salcedo
to nine years in prison.
12. See United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1996).
13. Some commentary regarding "authorization" under the CFAA has invoked the
common law tort of trespass to chattels to illustrate what the statute leaves largely undefined in
this respect (a separate discussion of trespass to chattels follows a later section of this paper).
See S. REP. No. 104-357, at 11 (1996). In discussing unauthorized access under the CFAA, the
Senate Report provides: "[O]utside hackers who break into a computer could be punished for
any intentional, reckless, or other damage they cause by their trespass." Id. (emphasis added).
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the means of access 4 or its purpose."s  Courts have also found
unauthorized access through a "Terms of Service" violation, even
where the defendant did not receive notice of the terms. 16 In America
Online v. LCGM, involving defendant's mass spamming of AOL
customers, the court wrote that "Defendants' actions violated AOL's
Terms of Service [agreement], and as such was unauthorized. 1 7 At
least one other court has held that a plaintiff can establish a lack of
authorization through the use of an "explicit statement on the website
restricting access."' 8  In EF Cultural Travel v. Zefer, involving a
defendant who used a scraper tool to extract data from a competitor's
website in order to underbid projects, the court also recognized that a
lack of authorization could exist implicitly, rather than explicitly in
the form of a statement.19  For example, the court noted that
"password protection itself normally limits authorization by
implication (and technology), even without express terms." 20  Of
particular relevance to the Wi-Fi context, the court found an implicit
lack of authorization, rejecting the view that there exists a
"presumption" of open access to the Internet.2'
This panoply of case law provides fairly broad (and potentially
confusing) latitude to courts in determining whether unauthorized
access has occurred in the case where defendant piggy-backs off of
another's WLAN. Under Zefer, lack of authorization can depend on
whether or not the WAP owner has implemented some procedure for
gaining access to the wireless network. 22 In this respect, absence of
14, See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(discussing access to public website using improper means of automating "robot"); see also
Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts B.V v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1322
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (discussing access to protected business network through improper means of
"spoofing," or forging, IP addresses to make unauthorized computer appear authorized).
15. See Register.corn, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (establishing unauthorized access
based on the use of data for mass marketing in competition with plaintiff).
16. See Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998).
AOL's terms of service provision against unsolicited e-mail applied to AOL members and non-
members. See also Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1273 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
17. Am. Online, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
18. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1 st Cir. 2003).
19. Id. at63.
20. id.
21. See id.; see also Jon Stanley, Whose "Hands" are "Unclean?" - SCO, IBM's
'Agents', and the CFAA, GROKLAW, Dec. 17, 2004, at
http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20041217091956894&query--Whose+%93Hands%9
4+are+%93Unclean%3F%94+.
22. See Zefer, 318 F.3d at 63, where the court recognized password protection as a limit
on authorization: "We agree with the district court that lack of authorization may be implicit,
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password protection, or a similar failure to take reasonable safeguards
against unauthorized use, such as encryption, may rebut the view that
any outside access to a private WLAN constitutes unauthorized
access. Still, under the presumption in Zefer that the end user's
default status in cyberspace remains "unauthorized" until governed by
either explicit or implicit agreements that grant access, the end user's
initial act of choosing an access point without permission, as
described above, could constitute unauthorized access in itself. This
aspect of the analysis becomes further complicated by the fact that,
for a variety of reasons, a certain percentage of HotSpot operators and
home-based Wi-Fi operators do not deploy any network security.2 3
Of 88,122 WAPs scanned in 2003, 67% had not enabled security
measures. 24 A more recent survey estimates that some 80% of U.S.
residential WLANs will classify as "unsecured' by 2007.25
Commentators speculate that operators fail to implement security
mainly due to a lack of expertise. 26  While automation and
simplification by manufacturers of the basic steps required to get a
WAP up and running has contributed to widespread adoption of Wi-
Fi technology, security implementation remains a painstaking and
complicated process for the average user.27 Further complexity has
arisen from the growing popularity of signal-boosting technology that
allows WAP users to expand the range of Wi-Fi signals, which can in
some cases provide access nearly 75 miles away to a WAP with a
normal range of 300 feet.28 Such factors invite inquiry about whether
open or unsecured WLANs serve as invitations to an implicit
agreement regarding Internet access, acceptance of which amounts to
authorization.29
rather than explicit. After all, password protection itself normally limits authorization by
implication (and technology), even without express terms." Id.
23. Matt Hines, Worried about Wi-Fi Security?, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 9, 2005, at
http://news.com.com/Worried+about+Wi-Fi+security/2100-7347_3-
5540969.html?tag=nefd.lede.
24. See Statistics for WorldWide WarDrive Il, Worldwide Wardrive, at
http://www.worldwidewardrive.org/wwwdstats.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
25. See Hines, supra note 23.
26. See id.
27. See Patrick S. Ryan, War, Peace, or Stalemate: Wargames, Wardialing, Wardriving,
and the Emerging Market for Hacker Ethics, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 1 108 (2004), at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue3/v9i3 a07-Ryan.pdf.; see also Jeremy Paul Sirota, Analog to
Digital: Harnessing Peer Computing, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 759,778 (2004).
28. See Hines, supra note 23.
29. See Benjamin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding and War-Driving: Roaming Use of Wi-
Fi and the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 128 (2004) (discussing in
more detail different approaches for finding intentional unauthorized access under the CFAA). •
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With regard to finding unauthorized access through a "Terms of
Service" violation, the AOL cases cited above provide precedent for
enforcing such terms on third parties with no privity of contract and
no notice of the terms.3 ° Internet Service Provider ("ISP") "Terms of
Service" typically prohibit many different types of activities,
including Internet access by those outside the subscriber's household
or business.3 1  Although the term applies directly to the customer
paying for the service, and not a third-party end user (or "Wi-Fi
interloper"), under the rationale of the AOL case cited above,
violation of such terms by non-members can amount to unauthorized
access for the purposes of the CFAA.32 In Register.com v. Verio, Inc.,
which, under the CFAA, enjoined defendant from accessing
noncopyrightable information on plaintiffs website, the court
established unauthorized access through Verio's violation of
Register.com's terms of use. 3 The court found that, although Verio
did not actually read and accept the terms of use, it manifested assent
to such terms when it submitted a request to the website for
information.34 The line of reasoning in Zefer further supports this
view to the extent that the end user remains "unauthorized" by
default, absent some explicit or implicit agreement.
Section 1030(a)(2) raises the issue of whether the unauthorized
access involves obtaining information. Although Congress intended
the CFAA to apply to theft-related acts, 35 some courts have
interpreted information obtained as "the showing of some additional
end-to which the unauthorized access is a means."36 In this regard,
access to any WLAN involves some exchange of information that
typically passes between computers (IP address, data packets, etc.) as
a means of gaining access to the Internet. Since the statute does not
30. See Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,451 (E.D. Va. 1998).
31. See SBC Yahoo! Terms of Service, SBC Yahoo!, available at
http://sbc.yahoo.com/terms/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2004).
32. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
33. Id. at 251-53.
34. Id. at 248. For a detailed analysis of the Verio case and the issue of establishing
unauthorized access under the CFAA via contract, see Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied:
Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly
Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320 (2004). Professor Galbraith cites several
court decisions and other factors that have facilitated the enforcement of standardized form
agreements on the Internet irrespective of whether a party assented to the terms (i.e., "shrink-
wrap" software licensing agreements and passage of the Uniform Computer Information
Transaction Act in some states). See id. at 338-45.
35. See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078 (1st Cir. 1997).
36. Id.
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specify exactly what information the end user must obtain, the end
user who accesses a neighbor's WLAN has potentially committed a
misdemeanor violation of section 1030(a)(2), which could then rise to
the level of a felony if the acts involved commercial advantage or
private financial gain.37 Criminalization of Wi-Fi interloping under
section 1030(a)(2), wherein someone merely uses another's WLAN to
check e-mail or to perform other common, relatively unobtrusive acts,
seems unlikely. In such a scenario, the end user does not access the
Internet to obtain information from the WAP operator, but rather to
simply access the Internet.
The next issue, raised by section 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii), concerns
whether the unauthorized access "recklessly causes damage., 38 The
statute defines "damage" as "any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information. '39 Courts
have held that prohibited conduct under the CFAA that causes
slowdowns and diminished capacity of computers, thereby impairing
the availability of the system, also constitutes "damage" under the
statute.40 In this regard, those using a neighbor's WLAN to download
large media files or large amounts of content could very easily slow
down or diminish Internet access availability on the neighbor's
computer. Given that most Internet users, especially those savvy
enough to have wireless access, know through experience that
content-rich files have a tendency to exhaust broadband capacity,
prosecutors could probably meet the statute's mens rea requirement
of recklessness by providing evidence of the defendant's regular
access of large media files. In this sense, the actions of a defendant
who systematically downloaded large amounts of data, including
music, movies and video games, would reach beyond mere
negligence to the higher threshold of recklessness. For civil relief, the
CFAA requires proof of "loss to [one] or more persons during any
[one]-year period... aggregating at least $5,000 in value. ' 41
Although $5,000 may appear difficult to meet for cases involving the
occasional interloper, systematic downloading in numerous instances
over a period of months could easily aggregate damage figures
beyond this threshold. Also, in class actions, courts have permitted
aggregation of the statutory amount among various members of the
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (c)(2)(B)(i) (2001).
38. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii).
39. Id. § 1030(e)(8).
40. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274
(N.D. Iowa 2000).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i), (g) (2001).
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plaintiff's class.42
Although prosecutors have tended to use the CFAA solely to
punish theft-related acts involving computers, the proliferating use of
Wi-Fi could change this, or provoke related activity at the state level
43
or under federal wiretap laws, such as the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act.44
B. Intercepting a Wireless Signal
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), also
known as the "Wire Tap Law," holds that "[it shall not be unlawful]
for other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio
communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies
monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of such
system, if such communication is not scrambled or encrypted.A5
Prosecutors have used the law to target certain acts of wireless
interceptions and signal theft.46  The ECPA also imposes federal
penalties, both criminal and civil, on anyone who "intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to
intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication., 47  Violations of the ECPA involve five key
elements. An individual must: (1) intentionally (2) intercept,
endeavor to intercept, or procure another person to intercept (3) the
contents of (4) an electronic communication (5) using a device. a  As
with the CFAA, a court could apply these elements to the context of
unauthorized Wi-Fi access quite easily. Again, most systems provide
notice in some form making unauthorized access intentional to the
extent that the user receives the notice. The user then intercepts the
wireless signal by accessing it and inevitably receives the contents of
an electronic communication through receipt of standard IP packets.
As with the CFAA, prosecutors tend to focus application of the ECPA
42. See In re Am. Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
43. All fifty states have some form of computer crime legislation, with sanctioned
conduct differing from state to state. For a comprehensive list of applicable state statutes, see
Galbraith, supra note 34, at 327 n.59.
44. 18 U.s.c. § 2511 (2001).
45. Id. § 2511(2)(g)(v).
46. See Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 294 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that pager "clones"
used to intercept numeric transmissions to digital pagers constituted unauthorized interception
under the ECPA); United States v. Davis, 978 F.2d 415, 419-20 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding it
unlawful to intentionally intercept commercial satellite programming, particularly with regard to
encrypted transmissions).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(a) (2001).
48. 1d. § 2511(a).
[Vol. 21
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to specific intent crimes, such as accessing another's WAP for the
purpose of eavesdropping, rather than simply using another's
bandwidth. However, as Wi-Fi use proliferates and plaintiffs begin
emerging with claims, attorneys should expect to see a variety of
theories, given the unusual combination of elements that wireless
Internet access presents. For example, as noted above, Wi-Fi can
involve privacy and information security issues, as well as property
rights through the fact that it often broadcasts beyond physical
property boundaries. 49 Wi-Fi also, through its very nature, potentially
implicates radio spectrum issues through its use of the unlicensed 2.4
and 5 GHz radio bands,50 as well as broadband regulatory schemes
and antitrust issues through the fact that WLANs typically expand the
use of a product that Internet Service Providers supply to customers
on a contractually limited basis.5'
A practical advantage may lie in using the common law tort of
trespass to chattels 52 to impose liability for unauthorized use of Wi-Fi,
rather than statutes such as the CFAA,53 which Congress intended
primarily for punishment of theft-related acts. 4 Although outside the
scope of this discussion, it remains important to note beyond the
Federal laws discussed here, that other Internet uses can trigger
criminal sanctions under other laws, among them, Federal laws such
as the Copyright Act,55 the National Stolen Property Act,56 mail 57 and
wire58 fraud statutes, the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 59 the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996,60 and the U.S.A Patriot
Act of 2001 .61 Assorted state laws show a corresponding sensitivity
49. See Hines, supra note 23.
50. See Patrick S. Ryan, Questioning the Scarcity of the Spectrum, 9 J. INTERNET L.
(forthcoming 2005).
51. • See infra Part III regarding ISP service terms that limit use of the service to one
person per household or business.
52. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
53. 18 U.S.C § 1030 (2001).
54. For a detailed discussion applying the CFAA to cyber-crimes, see Eric J. Sinrod &
William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the Application of Federal Computer
Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177 (2000). For a similarly
detailed discussion of the legal and ethical aspects of hacking WiFi networks, see Ryan, supra
note 27.
55. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2001).
56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2322 (2001).
57. Id. at § 1341.
58. Id. at § 1343.
59. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-231 (2000).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2256-2260 (2000).
61. 31 U.S.C. § 5318-5332 (2000).
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to the wide variety of criminal acts perpetrated on the Internet.,
C. Trespass to Chattels
Under California law, an action for trespass to chattels arises
when an intentional interference with the possession of personal
property causes injury.62 Courts have found the basic elements of
trespass to chattels (with the exception of damages) satisfied in many
different types of unauthorized computer access cases. 63  Most
notably, a case involving an ex-Intel worker who e-mailed thousands
of messages critical of his former employer to staffers at work
advanced to the California Supreme Court on the issue of damages.64
In Intel v. Hamidi, the court held that trespass to chattels in California
"does not encompass, and should not be extended to encompass, an
electronic communication that neither damages the recipient
computer system nor impairs its functioning., 65  Nonetheless, the
court offered relevant examples of what has constituted damages in
other cases involving unauthorized computer access, including
overburdening or interference with the efficient functioning of
computer systems 66 and threatened harm in the potential for others to
imitate the defendant's activity. 67 With respect to the first example, a
neighbor's teenager's use of another neighbor's Wi-Fi to download
large media files to play video games could result in overburdening or
interference with the efficient functioning of the neighbor's computer
system, especially involving the speed of data transfer. Another
increasingly probable scenario involves the use of VoIP in the same
context, where a neighbor could make phone calls using another's
wireless access point. In regard to the second example, again it seems
likely that the trespassing teenager would share his discovery with
friends in the neighborhood about the "free" wireless Internet access
62. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
63. Id. (finding that evidence of automated searching of a telephone carrier's system for
authorization codes constitutes a cause of action for trespass to chattels); see also Am. Online,
Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24
F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51(E.D. Va. 1998); Hotmail Corp. v. VanS Money Pie, Inc., 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 38 (N.D. Cal. 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 1015, 1020-23 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
64. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
65. Id. at 300.
66. See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(involving automated searching of a telephone carrier's system for authorization codes).
67. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058,1071-72 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (finding that eBay was entitled to an injunction where defendant's auction aggregation
site accessed eBay's web site 100,000 times per day).
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available down the block. This might in turn encourage threatened
harm in the potential for others to imitate the defendant's activity,
which, at least under California law, may provide the basis for an
injunction against the defendant.
Another likely result involves use of the unsuspecting neighbor's
broadband to power the trespasser's computer in peer-to-peer ("P2P")
systems, which, according to the Federal Trade Commission,
differ from others in that they support the decentralized discovery
and delivery of content from published directories, or shared
folders, posted on networked devices interconnected by means of
compatible software programs. Technologies that use central
servers require end users to access their databases first to search
for content and then to download it. By eliminating the needs for
centralized indices and storage capacity for content, P2P
technology allows for faster file transfers and conserves
bandwidth. 68
In this respect, a Wi-Fi interloper conducting activities on a P2P
network (such as file sharing) would leverage the computing power
and bandwidth of the unsuspecting neighbor who operates the
trespassed Wi-Fi.
Among the several defenses to trespass to chattels, apparent
consent appears most likely to arise given current trends in the
implementation of Wi-Fi, particularly with regard to private
residences. Under the Restatement, "[i]f words or conduct are
reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.",
6 9
Lack of log-in procedures, encryption, or other forms of security may
create a privilege in the would-be trespasser of apparent consent to
use another's Wi-Fi network. This scenario seems plausible under a
reasonable person standard given the fact that Wi-Fi routers usually
come equipped with safeguards, such as log-in procedures and
encryption, that the owner can choose whether or not to deploy. A
regular Wi-Fi user, whose laptop may automatically detect the
presence of a WLAN, would come to expect to find such safeguards
in place, and then, not seeing these protections, reasonably assume
that the plaintiff WLAN owner has granted some form of apparent
68. See Marty Lafferty, Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Technology: Consumer Protection
and Competition Issues, DISTRIBUTING COMPUTING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/p2pfileshare/OL-1 00012.pdf (Nov. 14, 2004).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 892 (1977).
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consent. 70  However, according to Prosser, "[t]he defendant's
privilege is limited to the conduct to which the plaintiff consents, or at
least to acts of a substantially similar nature., 71 Here, a court may
turn to custom 72 to help determine whether a scope of privilege
rebuttal applies in this context. For instance, the defendant could cite
evidence that those who piggy-back off of other's WLANs typically
do so only to perform relatively unobtrusive Internet activities, such
as checking e-mail or surfing Web pages. In turn, plaintiff can cite,
probably more persuasively, that those who piggy-back typically
engage in activities that take up considerable bandwidth, such as
downloading music files. 73 Plaintiff could also try invoking Zefer
74
by arguing that the defendant's default status remains unauthorized in
the absence of some form of explicit or implicit agreement. In
addition to rebutting this view by interpreting plaintiff's open WAP as
a form of implicit agreement, defendant may also try to turn the tables
by calling into question plaintiffs potential liability for providing any
open wireless Internet access to those outside plaintiffs residence.75
This brief analysis certainly does not end the application of tort
principles to the hypothetical at issue or other factual permutations.
For instance, contributory liability may apply to those who make
others aware of open WLANs. The phenomenon of "warchalking"
comes to mind in this respect, whereby Wi-Fi enthusiasts provide
notice of available WAPs and HotSpots by marking hieroglyphics in
70. A scenario with parallels to the discussion above exploring whether unsecured
WLANs serve as invitations to an implicit agreement regarding access, acceptance of which
constitutes authorization under the CFAA.
71. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 18 (5th ed.
1984).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 892 cmt. d (1977):
In determining whether conduct would be understood by a reasonable person as
indicating consent, the customs of the community are to be taken into account.
This is true particularly of silence or inaction. Thus if it is the custom in wooded
or rural areas to permit the public to go hunting on private land or to fish in
private lakes or streams, anyone who goes hunting or fishing may reasonably
assume, in the absence of a posted notice or other manifestation to the contrary,
that there is the customary consent to his entry upon private land to hunt or fish.
73. Sandeep Junnarkar, One Way to Get Online: Piggyback, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004,
at G5.
74. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2003).
75. See Nick Langley, The Demise of the Warchalkers, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, June
24, 2003, at http://www.computerweekly.com/Articlel22783.htm. Courts and commentators
continue to debate the wisdom of applying trespass to chattels to the cyberspace context
generally. See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27,
37 (2000).
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chalk on adjacent sidewalks.76 In considering how liability could
extend to such acts, note that defendants in the Salcedo case
77
discovered the unsecured wireless network which they later hacked
into, while driving around charting wireless networks on their laptops
(a geek sport known as "wardriving" - a variant of "warchalking"). 78
Assuming prosecutors could have charged certain defendants
involved in locating the open WLAN with aiding and abetting the
target CFAA violation, systematic dissemination of information on
where to find open WAPs could provide a basis for seeking
contributory liability to the extent that such activity encourages
unauthorized use of others' Wi-Fi networks.79
III. ACCESS POINT LIABILITY
Internet service providers typically include in the written terms
and conditions certain provisions that restrict service to one business
or household per modem. 80  For instance, the terms of service for
SBC Yahoo! contain the following provision under the "Resale of
Service" section:
Restricted Use. You agree not to permit anyone else to use your
Member Account and that each Sub Account may only be used by
one member of your household or business.
81
Similarly, Verizon's personal DSL agreement states that "[y]ou
may not resell the Broadband Service, use it for high volume
purposes, or engage in similar activities that constitute resale
(commercial or non-commercial), as determined solely by Verizon.
82
Assuming that ISPs police such activity, 83  a provider could
76. See Langley, supra note 75.
77. See Bill of Indictment at 1-2, United States v. Salcedo, (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2003)
(No. 5.03cr53-MCK); Criminal Docket for Case #: 03-CR-53-ALL, available at
http://pacer.ncwd.uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-bin/pacer250.pl?puid=01094528557; see also Pierce,
supra note 11.
78. The term "wardriving" derives from the old hacker practice called wardialing, which
the actor Matthew Broderick made famous in the 1983 film "WarGames." Broderick's character
hacked into a military computer by wardialing through a telephone-based modem, and nearly
triggered a nuclear war with Russia. See Kern, supra note 29, at 104 n.7.
79. See Wifinder, supra note 5.
80. See Junnarkar, supra note 73.
81. See SBC Yahoo! Terms of Service, supra note 31.
82. See Verizon Internet Access Terms of Service, Verizon, available at
http://www2.verizon.net/policies/tos.asp (last visited Dec. 03, 2004).
83. Although at least one ISP has admitted that they do not "actively" police Wi-Fi
piggy-backing (see Junnarkar, supra note 73), another ISP has acknowledged that it has actively
searched open wireless access points that are shared in violation of its service contracts. See
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presumably terminate the contract of a customer who violates these
kinds of provisions. Certain state laws may also impose liability on
WAP operators who provide access in violation of ISP terms of
service. Maryland, for example, prohibits the use of a "device,
technology, [or] product ... used to provide the unauthorized access
to ... transmission [of], or acquisition of a telecommunication service
provided by a telecommunication service provider., 84  Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Virginia and Wyoming all have laws on
the books that may invoke similar liability.85  Delaware law, for
instance, prohibits "the unauthorized acquisition or theft of any
telecommunication service or to receive, disrupt, transmit, decrypt,
acquire or facilitate the receipt, disruption, transmission, decryption
or acquisition of any telecommunication service without the express
consent or express authorization of the telecommunication service
provider."
86
Wireless access operators could also incur liability to the extent
that they make access available, and in doing so, facilitate activities
that damage others. Continuing the earlier hypothetical, if someone
downloads unauthorized copies of music files using another's
WLAN, and thereby commits copyright infringement, vicarious
liability for the infringement may attach to the WAP operator. As
demonstrated in the A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.87 decision,
which involved vicarious copyright infringement liability of a peer-to-
peer network provider, courts limit such liability to cases where the
peer-to-peer network has "the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities.,, 88 Regarding the right and ability to supervise, home-based
WAPs typically do not come packaged with monitoring mechanisms
that would facilitate the tracking of potentially infringing activity
(assuming operators have a right to supervise such activity). In
addition, although WAPs typically feature technology that allows the
operator to block certain users, these types of functions usually
Langley, supra note 75.
84. See MD. CODE ANN., CRlM. L. § 7-313 (2002).
85. See Mark Rasch, WiFi High Crimes, SECURITY Focus, May 3, 2004, at
http://www.security focus.com/columnists/237.
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 850(a)(1)(a) (2001).
87. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming District Court's authority to force Napster to use filter mechanisms to police
copyrighted works).
88. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
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require the operator to implement security options that the average
user* would probably avoid due to complexity and lack of
automation. 89 Regarding direct financial interest, given that those
who deploy Wi-Fi residentially do so primarily to make the Internet
more accessible within their own homes, it seems unlikely that home-
based WAP operators would have any financial interest in infringing
activities. Commercial HotSpot operators may have some indirect
financial interest to the extent that infringing users may run up more
access fees in their attempts to download infringing media files. Still,
prevailing reluctance9" to impose responsibility on ISPs for harmful
conduct committed by end users would probably protect these parties
from contributory liability in this context.
IV. CONCLUSION-AVOIDING LIABILITY, SEEKING REMEDIES,
CONSIDERING POLICY
As a general matter, until the courts and legislatures better define
the legal status of Wi-Fi arrangements, the piggy-backing Wi-Fi user
should simply stop the practice of accessing others' open WLANs,
absent an explicit agreement or notice. If a Wi-Fi interloper must
continue, he or she should avoid heavy downloading activity (music,
games, movies, etc.) that has a tendency to overburden the network
and may amount to recoverable damages. Similarly, sapping a
residential neighbor's Internet service in lieu of paying for one's own
seems potentially more culpable than accessing signals in a business
area while on a lunch break. On the other hand, those for whom
piggy-backing supplies the only practicable means of obtaining
residential high-speed Internet access may want to seek out services
that provide Wi-Fi sharing arrangements, through which ISPs pass
through service payments from end users on to WAP operators.
9 1
89. The Linksys Wireless-G Access Point (product number WAP54G) provides features
that allow the operator to control who has access to the WLAN, but the product does not support
the ability to track or monitor Internet activity.
90. See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable,
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, JOHN M OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER No. 217 (2ND
SERIES), (July 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 573502. In addition to citing ISP
immunity provisions in the Communications Decency Act of 1996 and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, the authors note that "Courts interpreting these provisions have
reinforced this apparent trend away from ISP liability by, among other things, interpreting these
statutes to preempt state laws that would otherwise have encouraged ISPs to take due care." Id.
at 4.
91. Speakeasy Broadband Services, LLC, a Seattle-based ISP, provides such a service.
See WiFi NetShare Service, Speakeasy Broadband Services, available at
http://www.speakeasy.net/netshare/learnmore/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
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The WAP operator can mitigate liability by implementing -a
secure network through the use of password protection ,and
encryption. To the extent that the operator can identify any
interlopers, the operator should take steps to exclude such users from
the network.92  Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the difficulty
involved both in securing and monitoring WLANs adds confusion to
the issue of the operator's potential liability. As manufacturers strive
to create simple, "plug-and-play" Wi-Fi kits, home users become
increasingly less likely to attain the necessary network administration
skills that proper Wi-Fi security and maintenance require. A
manufacturer's recent offering of Wi-Fi security paint, containing
compounds which effectively block all radio signals, illustrates the
apparent futility of implementing secure wireless networks.93 In
response to these difficulties, Wi-Fi equipment makers such as
Linksys and Hewlett-Packard recently announced plans to create a
push-button security system for home wireless product entitled,
"SecureEasySetup. ' '94  Of course, the Wi-Fi sharing arrangement
mentioned above also provides an apparently legal option for the
WLAN operator to share the signal with others while defraying
monthly service costs.
Despite the difficulties involved in securing and monitoring Wi-
Fi networks, operators seeking statutory or common law remedies for
damages caused by interlopers may need to develop the necessary
technical skills in order to support a cause of action. For instance, in
moving a claim forward, the plaintiff will need to provide proof that
the alleged interloper accessed plaintiffs WLAN, as well as evidence
of damages. In doing so, the plaintiff will need to produce log files
that identify the defendant and other evidence that shows the
defendant's activity interrupted the network to such an extent as to
justify damages. Also, the plaintiffs case would certainly benefit
from providing proof that he or she implemented appropriate security
measures and attempted to exclude the defendant from access, which
would tend to demonstrate a form of notice in establishing the
defendant's unauthorized access.
From a policy perspective, recent efforts by municipalities to
provide free Internet access to the public95 highlight contrasting views
92. See Kern, supra note 29 for an expanded discussion of the policy implications
associated with implementing security measures on Wi-Fi networks.
93. See Jim Nash, Startup Markets Wireless-Security Paint, INFORMATIONWEEK, Dec.
28, 2004, at http://infornationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtnl?articlelD=56200676.
94. See Hines, supra note 23.
95. See Philly: Let Wi-Fi Ring, supra note 4.
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about whether such services should evolve as radio and television
(services which still offer free access) rather than as a private
commodity. The concept of free public Internet access as a desired
goal may tend to influence people with Wi-Fi equipped devices to use
wireless access freely wherever and whenever they can access it.
Also, the fact that Wi-Fi operates on unlicensed radio frequencies
may invite further analogies to conventional radio, giving rise to
presumptions that open broadcast signals from Wi-Fi networks exist
in the public domain, irrespective of origin. In the meantime, in
addition to the public, virtually all the major Internet industry players,
including ISPs, equipment manufacturers, content providers and
government continue to become increasingly dependent on expanding
broadband availability and capacity. In this respect, rather than
pursuing WAP operators who violate terms of service with open
access points, ISPs may find more success in encouraging such
activity as much as possible and allowing ensuing demand to drive
appropriate pricing structures in the brave new world of Wi-Fi. Until
then, or perhaps irrespective of market solutions, novel legal issues
with respect to Wi-Fi will most likely continue to arise.
2005]

